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Essay
An Introduction for Judges and Lawyers
to Plato's Apology of Socrates
William T. Braithwaite*

Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, ....said: "Socrates, ought
you not to be giving some thought to what defence you are
going to make?" . . . Socrates had at first replied, "Why, do I
not seem to you to have spent my whole life in preparing to
defend myself?" Then when he asked, "How so?" he had said,
"Because all my life I have been guiltless of wrong-doing; and
that I consider the finest preparation for a defence.
-Xenophon,
1979).

Socrates' Defence to the Jury, p. 643 (Todd tr.,
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Why read the Apology?
That the courtroom is one of our favorite locales for drama is shown
by the number of famous trials in our history and by the stories about
them woven into our popular culture. In the history of Western
civilization, two trials in particular share an undisputed position of coprimacy, by reason of their drama, their instructiveness, and the
oceanic influence that the defendants' lives and words have had on all
later generations, including our own. These are the trials of Socrates
and Jesus.
It was nearly twenty centuries ago, about the year 30 of our era, that
Jesus appeared before the Jewish authorities on a charge of blasphemy
(Matt. 26:63-66) and then before the Roman governor Pontius Pilate
on a charge of treason (Luke 23:2). This was more than four centuries
after Socrates appeared, also pro se, before an Athenian jury. In the
order of time, then, if on no other ground, Socrates' trial has precedence. Plato's Apology tells the most important part of the story.
Most law students, if they have not had any opportunity to find out
who Socrates is before the first year of law school, eventually hear (or
should) of the so-called "Socratic" method of classroom instruction, or
they see someone subjected to it. Law school might be somewhat less
tedious than many students today seem to find it, especially in their last
year, if more of their teachers who try to use this method could find
the opportunity to study a few models of its practice by the Greek
philosopher after whom it is named. Reading Plato's Apology is a
good way to begin puzzling out what Socrates was really up to with
his peculiar questioning.
Since Socrates is certainly one of the greatest cross-examiners of all
time, law students who want to become trial lawyers, as well as trial
lawyers themselves, indeed anyone who has an interest in trials,
should find it instructive to study Socrates' method of asking questions. His cross-examination, in the Apology, of Meletus, one of his
accusers, is a good beginning to this study. He shows us how to ask
good questions about serious matters, no mean skill for men and
women in the law.
Socrates is the first man we know of in the history of the West, or
the most famous, to be put to death, by law, not for something he did
or something he failed to do when he should have, but only for his
words, for what he said, and so indirectly for what he thought. Thus,
his life marks the beginning of the history of freedom of speech and
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also, as we might say today, of freedom of thought, or conscience.
His trial and execution are the original seeds, although remote, of the
First Amendment.
A serious reading of Plato's Apology of Socrates can help us begin
to learn what freedom of speech properly means. (It does not, for
Socrates, mean what most of us today think it means). We might
begin to see, as well, its limitations, the risks in having it, and the
sources of the danger that it can be lost. The Apology can also show
us why it is often unwise, even harmful, to do or say something for no
other reason than that one has a "right" to. Freedom of speech can be
abused, that is, by those who do not appreciate both its purposes and
its fragility.
It is good that American judges and lawyers, especially, to whose
work freedom of speech is so essential, should bear always in mind
that this is a freedom comparatively few people have ever had. Most
people alive in the world today do not have it, certainly not in the form
Americans take mostly for granted. Recent political events in the nonWestern parts of the world are not re-assuring about the prospects for
extending the right to freedom of speech and thought any time in the
foreseeable future.
This freedom seems to be unique to the West, to the civilization that
originated in the confluence of traditions identified with two famous
ancient cities, Athens and Jerusalem (and later, Rome). The origin of
freedom of speech can be found in the West, and its development there
followed historically. These facts mean it could disappear if the
conditions for its nurture, preservation, and proper practice are not
maintained.
B. Who was Socrates?
Socrates was born in Athens in the year 469 of the fifth century
before the Christian or common era. Except when military service
took him away, he stayed in or near the city of his birth throughout his
whole life. These absences were during the long conflict between
Athens and Sparta, 431-404 B.C., that historians call the
Peloponnesian War (Sparta is in the southern peninsula of Greece,
called the Peloponnesus). Socrates served during his forties, and as
an infantryman, he distinguished himself by unusual courage and fortitude.
He is said to have been trained as a stone-cutter, or sculptor, the
occupation of his father Sophroniscus. His mother, Phaenarete, was a
midwife. History presents him as a man never much busy at gainful
work, and so at leisure to spend a good portion of his time engaged in
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conversations that seem, oddly, at once both familiar and alien when
we read accounts of them. It is mainly through the accounts of these
conversations, with all manner of men and, perhaps, a few women,
that we can get to know whatever of this remarkable man it may still be
possible to know after the passing of twenty-four centuries.
Socrates did his civic duties as an Athenian citizen but otherwise
sought no part in public affairs except as an observer and commentator. Yet he somehow made enough enemies to get himself indicted in
399, when he was seventy, for corrupting the young and impiety.
These charges were related, as we will see. He was convicted,
evidently on both counts, and sentenced to death.
In the company of friends who had come to be with him for a last
conversation, Socrates died in his prison cell by drinking poison
prepared for him by the jail authorities. A friend who was present,
Phaedo, ends his report of the occasion with the observation that
Socrates was "of all those of his time whom we have known, the best
and wisest and most just" (Plato, Phaedo 113a, Fowler tr.) He was
survived by his wife Xanthippe and three sons.
C. What is Plato'sApology of Socrates?
Plato's Apology is the chief account of Socrates' trial. Nowadays,
"apology" brings first to mind a saying we're sorry. But in the title of
Plato's work, the word has its original meaning, a formal written or
spoken defense. The word's roots, in Greek, are a preposition meaning "from" and a noun meaning, most commonly, "speech" or
"reason." An apology is a reasoning in which the apologist tries to
speak away from himself the blame or consequences that would
usually follow something he has done, or, in Socrates' case, things he
had said. The arguments lawyers make in trials and on appeal are a
species of apology in this original, technical sense.
D. What is our evidence about Socrates?
Socrates said much but wrote nothing, as far as we know. The
record of his life and words, such as we have it, was made by others.
Our four main sources are Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, and
Diogenes Laertius. The first three of these were Socrates' contemporaries, men alive when he was and who were closely associated with
him. Diogenes lived over six centuries later.
The earliest source is mentioned in the Apology itself, "the comedy
of Aristophanes" (19c; see also 18d).* The play referred to, Clouds, is
*

These numbers and letters are the conventional way of referring to specific places
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a burlesque of Socrates; it was first performed in 423 B.C., twentyfour years before the trial. Some of the older jurors would certainly
have seen it; most if not all of them had very likely heard about it. The
parody this play presents is treated by Socrates at his trial as a wellknown fact of popular culture: "you yourselves also used to see these
things in the comedy of Aristophanes" (19c).
Aristophanes was the greatest ancient Greek writer of stage comedy.
He was younger than Socrates by fifteen to twenty years (the exact
year of his birth is not known). Since he outlived Socrates by more
than a decade, it is possible that he was present at the trial.
Scholars believe Aristophanes wrote about forty plays; the texts of
eleven survive. They use fantasy, invective, and licentious humor to
satirize contemporary Athenian society, its political and literary
personalities, and its foreign policy (in the Peloponnesian War, e.g.).
In another work of Plato, Symposium, Socrates and Aristophanes
are among the guests at a drinking party where the after-dinner entertainment is a contest to see who can make the best speech about love.
Socrates out-speaks and out-drinks everyone, leaving at dawn after all
the other guests, including Aristophanes, have drunk themselves into
stupor.
Our single most important source for Socrates' life and thought, the
largest in bulk, and next in order of time after Aristophanes' Clouds, is
the writings of Socrates' friend and much younger contemporary,
Plato. Born forty years later, Plato knew the older philosopher from
childhood, most likely through Critias and Charmides, a cousin and
brother of Plato's mother, who were friends of Socrates.
Since Plato came from a distinguished and politically connected
family, it was natural that his first ambition be toward public life. In
the half-century before his birth, ancient Athens was at the peak of her
glory, influence, and power. But during the first twenty-five years of
his life, the city was engaged in its repeatedly mismanaged war with
Sparta that marked the beginning of a decline from which it never fully
recovered. The Peloponnesian War finally ended when Athens capitulated in April 404, after nearly three decades of intermittent conflict.
The violent political changes of the immediate post-war period
contributed directly to Socrates' trial and execution five years later.
These events helped turn Plato, who was just thirty when Socrates
died, away from politics to philosophy as a vocation. (Plato records
himself as present at Socrates' trial (38b), but because of illness, he
in Plato's texts. In the West and West translation, drawn on in this essay, these
references are found, as is standard, in the margins.
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was not present when Socrates died).
Plato's written work, which scholars believe we have the entire
body of, consists of thirty-five dialogues and thirteen letters. Some of
these works, including the Apology, are certainly genuine, but as to
others, there have been disputes about their authenticity. Most of the
dialogues, both the genuine and the disputed, are in the form of
conversations between a protagonist, usually Socrates, and one or
more interlocutors. Usually, too, there are some listeners present who
take part only a little, or not at all, in the conversation. Plato's
dialogues present the fullest picture we can get of Socrates' thought
and of his peculiar questioning.
Our third source of evidence about Socrates is the writings of
Xenophon, a comparatively wealthy Athenian aristocrat one or two
years younger than Plato. Among Xenophon's best-known works are
Cyropaediaand Anabasis. Cyropaedia ("the education of Cyrus") is a
kind of historical novel about the education of a Persian prince. It
draws on Xenophon's observations in Asia Minor as an officer in a
contingent of Greek mercenaries undertaking to help Cyrus the
Younger wrest the Persian throne from his elder brother, Artaxerxes
II. Anabasis ("going up"), which may be more familiar as The Persian
Expedition, the descriptive title given it by one translator, tells the
adventures of the Greek mercenaries in Persia and of their retreat,
under Xenophon's command, after Cyrus was killed at the Battle of
Cunaxa, north of Babylon, in 401 B.C., two years before Socrates'
trial.
Three works of Xenophon deal directly with Socrates:
- Memorabilia is his familiar recollections of the older man.
The first two of its four books, supposed to have been written
about eighteen years after Socrates' trial, include a defense of
him against the charges made in 399.
- Apology, titled in one translation Socrates' Defence to the
Jury (p. 507, above), is a short account of Socrates' attitude
about the charges against him, professing to be based on the
first-hand observations of Hermogenes, a friend of Socrates with
him during his last days (Xenophon himself was not then in
Athens).
* Oeconomicus includes dialogues between Socrates and
Critobulus on household and property management.
The last of our four principal sources of information about Socrates,
and the latest in time, is Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers,
a collection of biographical sketches by Diogenes Laertius, whom
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scholars believe lived in the first half of the third century A.D., about
600 years after Socrates' death. His sketch of Socrates is familiar, not
formal, in tone and content. It includes a number of sayings and
epigrams attributed to Socrates, repeats some of the biographical facts
found in the Apology and other dialogues of Plato, and also gives
information not found in any other extant sources.
E. Is Plato a reliablewitness?
First-time readers sometimes wonder whether Plato, the student and
friend of Socrates, is a reliable witness.
About Plato's disinterestedness, we can say much the same things
as trial lawyers say about witnesses. If the witness was called by the
opposing party and testifies adversely to your side, you can say his
credibility is affected by a predisposition in favor of the party calling
him. If your own witness is attacked in this way, you can reply that
an interest in the outcome does not necessarily impel falsehood, or
prevent the witness from telling the truth. Both arguments are general
truths, of course, and their weight in any particular case will depend
on the circumstances.
Plato is not an uninvolved third party who just happened to observe
the trial, nor was he like a professional journalist reporting events for
an audience unable to see them first-hand. Neither was he an historian
claiming a neutral and detached concern for documentable facts. He
knew Socrates from the time he was quite young, and was closely
associated with him from his youth until Socrates' death, being the
most gifted student of an extraordinarily gifted teacher. He certainly
had a heart-felt interest in the outcome of the trial as well as a definite
opinion about the way Socrates should be remembered by history.
Socrates plays a prominent part in most of the 35 dialogues that
ancient sources say Plato wrote. Two of the dialogues, the Republic,
in which Socrates is the leading speaker, and the Laws, in which a
Socrates-like character appears ("the Athenian Stranger"), are quite
lengthy, each of them making a book of several hundred pages in
modern editions. These facts alone tell us that Plato cared very much
about how Socrates was to be presented to whatever audience Plato
supposed might read the dialogues, whether Greeks then alive,
foreigners in other cities, or unknown and yet unborn peoples in faraway places and far-off times.
We cannot say Plato is disinterested, if by that we mean he has no
interest in his subject. Plato's interest in writing about Socrates was at
least as great as Carl Sandberg's was in writing about Lincoln, or
Churchill's in writing about the history of the English-speaking
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peoples. But who would want to read a book written by someone
with no genuine interest in its subject, or with no opinions about what
was true and not true regarding its subject?
What the reader really wants to know is whether Plato's interest
materially affected what we would call today his "objectivity." This is
natural enough: the reader who approaches a serious book seriously
must always ask what the relation is between the truth and the author's
opinions. Yet such a question can get in the way of understanding
what Plato says about Socrates, because it assumes a way of writing
and reading which are not proper to Plato's project.
Those of us who are trained in the law tend to be historicist in our
perspective. For us, "facts" mean what the witnesses and documents
say; "objectivity" in a brief on appeal is judged by the extent to which
the argument is supported by facts in "the record." And when judges
or lawyers speak, as some of them occasionally do, of the trial as "a
search for the truth," they mean the historical truth of the events out of
which the litigation arose. In all these ways, we show our underlying
assumption that there is some truth to be found out, that it is historical
in character, and that it can be ascertained, sufficiently for the law's
practical purposes, by collecting and weighing the "evidence," which
we take to consist essentially in reports of what people said and did.
Plato is not writing as a lawyer or historian, however. Neither is he
writing fiction, in the sense of made-up events. Still, although the
Apology is a special form of writing, it is a form not unfamiliar to us.
The form is literature about history. Examples of this genre are
Truman Capote's non-fiction novel, In Cold Blood (1965), the true
story of the murder of a Kansas farm family by two drifters and
Michael Shaara's The Killer Angels (1974), on which the movie
"Gettysburg" is based.
Capote and Shaara were literary artists trying to tell the essential
truth of certain events. Neither of them regarded this "poetic" truth as
being one and the same with historical truth. Historical truth is the
ascertainable facts, the names, the dates, the people, times, and places,
their thoughts, feelings, and actions. But the historical record we may
happen to have about an event often depends on chance. Not every
important thing is written down or otherwise preserved, not everything
preserved is reliable, and some evidence that is important and reliable
does not survive to posterity.
As distant in time as we are today from the Battle of Gettysburg or
the trial of Socrates, we cannot use the "realism" of the photograph
and the microscope as the only standard of reliability by which to
judge accounts of these events. Something more than mere facts is
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needed in order to tell the whole story, for as trial lawyers and trial
judges well know, mere facts never "speak for themselves." They
have to be given voice by an art. In the law, that art is argument, or
rhetoric; in literature, it is poetry (from a Greek root, poiein, meaning
"to make"), which, broadly understood, is the art of making images in
order to tell stories that convey "poetic truth," the truth one feels in the
bones.
F. Is the Apology a reliable trial record?

Concerning the reliability of Plato's account of Socrates' trial, there
is another problem as well, besides the difficulties implicit in the
difference between history ("the facts") and literature (in which the
imagination of the author, as distinguished from the intellect, plays a
decisive part in discerning what the story is and how it should be told).
This other problem is that Socrates did not, as far as we know, himself
write anything down.
Why did Socrates limit his disclosure to conversation, to questions
and answers? Plato knew, of course, that after Socrates died, his
spoken words could not be preserved for future generations except in
written form. This may sufficiently explain why Plato chose to write;
it does not explain why Socrates choose not to.
The differences between writing and speaking are not unfamiliar to
those trained in the law, especially to judges in our common law
system, which relies so heavily on oral testimony in trials. My definite
impression is that trial lawyers, when they have a choice, usually
prefer presenting a witness live rather than through an affidavit or
deposition transcript. Certainly this was my preference during the
decade and 30-odd military and civil trials of my practice.
Does this preference for spoken testimony reflect a judgment, or
perhaps an intuitive sense, that some things are better said face to face,
or can only be understood properly if spoken to the intended audience
rather than read by it? Is it better, for example, to make a proposal of
marriage in a letter or face-to-face?
Of course, it might also be the case that some other things are better
said in writing, or can only be understood properly if put on paper, so
that the audience can read and re-read, weigh, discriminate, and judge
what is said. Are offers of settlement in litigation, for example, better
written or spoken? A good man's word may be his bond, but lawyers
do seem to prefer, in most cases, to "get it in writing."
Both the written word and the spoken word seem to have their
advantages and their limitations. Do not our practices in presenting
and deciding appeals reflect this supposition? We provide by law for
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both a written argument, the brief, and an oral argument. The panel of
reviewing judges deliberates orally in private, then one of them is
assigned to render their conclusion and reasons into a writing, which
eventually becomes the published opinion. Sometimes, the decision
"doesn't write," as I have heard one judge express it: the effort to put
the argument on paper reveals gaps or flaws in a line of reasoning that
had seemed persuasive when it was spoken aloud.
In published opinions, appellate judges sometimes refer to the written report of what happened in the trial court as a "cold record." This
short-hand judicial colloquialism means that some opinions formed by
the judge and jury who decided the case i"n the first instance, since they
saw the witnesses face to face, had ordinarily better not be secondguessed. What was seen and heard is given precedence over what the
court reporter wrote down.
In these and other ways, our legal system, and we who are its
agents and operators, recognize that the written word is not simply a
permanent-record counterpart of the spoken word, and that the spoken
word is not simply a fleeting instance of what could equally well be
written down. The question of whether it is better to write or to speak
aloud in a given situation can, and properly, be answered differently,
depending on what is to be said, who is going to say it and to whom,
the aims of the communication, the capacities of the audience, and the
particular circumstances in which the words will be uttered. What,
then, do these considerations tell us about why Socrates choose not to
write books but to ask questions face-to-face, one-on-one?
Are there some truths that can only be spoken, or which when written are inevitably distorted? For example, does not something more,
or at least something different, get communicated in ordinary conversation, in direct and cross-examination, and in oral argument than in a
letter, contract, or deposition transcript?
Plato could not see the audience for his dialogues, except in his
mind's eye, which we call the imagination. And, too, he knew that
what he wrote would inevitably come into the hands of readers not
intended to be among his primary audience, whoever this might have
been. Some of these readers, he must have known, might not be
qualified to understand fully everything he had written. Journalists,
for example, do not seem to be uniformly reliable readers and interpreters of judicial opinions (but, of course, neither are lawyers for that
matter).
Plato wrote an account not necessarily of the exact words Socrates
spoke at his trial, but of what he imagined Socrates' words should
sound like, in the mind's ear, to those who were not actually present at
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the trial, if they were to understand the essential truth of that event, that
is, the poetic truth, of what happened to Socrates and why. Plato
writes to his intended readers the words he chooses to represent
Socrates as having spoken to the jury, and we then read this written
account of that speech in order to re-create as fully as possible the
tenor and import of the words spoken and things done at the trial. To
effect this re-creating, we must ask ourselves, what is the meaning of
what Plato says Socrates said?
Such an inquiry into the meaning of a book is best carried forward
by means of conversation, the same mode of discourse Socrates
himself chose. Ideally, the conversants should be a small group (say,
about 15). They should sit so arranged that everyone can see one
another's faces, and each person should try hard to be attentive and to
listen open-mindedly when someone else speaks. It is probably better
not to bother trying to take notes, so that full attention can be given to
the turns and movements of the conversation. Plato's dialogues
present Socrates' conversations as typically occurring in conditions
somewhat like these (only in the Apology does Socrates speak to a
large group).
The writer and reader have none of these advantages. They cannot
see one another's faces; they are, in fact, strangers. Neither of them
can be sure that what has been written will not fall, or has not already
fallen, into the hands of "outsiders," persons not intended to be privy
to what is said. Since they are strangers to one another, neither the
writer nor the reader can be sure of the other's motives. Is the writer
moved by frankness, generosity, and friendship towards the truth? Is
the reader capable of patience, tolerance, and open-mindedness in
trying to discern what the writer really meant? Or does either of them
have somewhat different motives?
Is Plato, the student and friend, a reliable witness to report what
was said by his teacher and friend, Socrates? If we say no, what standard of judgment are we using? Plato's Apology is the only eyewitness account we have of Socrates' trial. For all practical purposes,
there are no other witnesses, no other evidence. This situation is
familiar, of course, to every trial judge and trial lawyer. How often
has each of us wondered, in a particular case, about the facts not
discovered or not even discoverable, the facts we do not know because
they are not knowable. We have to discern as much as we can from
whatever evidence we have.
Conversations, Socrates' preferred mode of discourse, are not in
principle subject to this limitation. Today's readers of the Apology,
for example, can seek out other readers and talk with them about the
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trial of Socrates for as long as any of them may wish. We need only
adjourn, and need not conclude, such conversations. We can meet
again tomorrow, next week, next year, to talk further about the same
book. The conversation is always open to being picked up again,
wherever it left off before or striking out in a new direction entirely.
The writer does not have this luxury. When the book is finished, it
is finished. He has said all he can say, at least in that book. The case
is rested, the record is closed.
Yet is this really quite true? The trial of Socrates is over and done
with; the man himself is dead and gone. Plato's Apology, our only
text about the trial, was written twenty-five centuries ago. But Plato's
conversation with us is not finished. We can recess that conversation
by putting down the book, but we can resume it by reading the book
again.
The production of a book is finished when the writer has rendered it
into whatever final whole he was aiming at, just as a brief is finished
when the lawyer has written the prayer for relief which concludes it.
But is the work of the writer the same thing as the work of his book?
The writer's work is complete when the book is complete, but the
book's work is complete only when the reader has come to understand
the book as fully as the author himself understood it. This means that
Plato's Apology of Socrates will not have completed its work until its
intended readers come to understand Socrates' arguments at trial the
same way he understood them.
But is this not obviously impossible? Even if we knew, or could
know, all of what Socrates knew, he lived in another time, another
place. The crimes he was indicted, tried, and executed for do not even
exist under our laws. Does it make any sense, in such circumstances,
to try to plumb Socrates' thoughts, or to divine Plato's intentions?
On the other hand, is not this problem, the problem of trying to
understand Plato's text as he himself understood it, very much like a
problem already long familiar to us? I mean the problem of determining the intentions of the Founding Fathers as expressed in the
Constitution. Indeed, in a general way, do not lawyers and judges
routinely face a similar problem whenever they are called upon to
interpret a document whose author is not available to explain what he
or she meant?
For Socrates' trial, we have only a "cold record," Plato's text.
What did Plato intend us to understand, from this one source, about
the trial, and about the words and thoughts of Socrates?
One way for law-trained readers to pursue this inquiry is to begin
with what seems most familiar. I propose to show how this could be
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done, by examining several topics in the Apology which are common
to the everyday work of lawyers and judges. These topics are (1) the
morally problematic character of legal arguments, (2) the influence of
public opinion on court proceedings, and (3) the art of cross-examination, as demonstrated in Socrates' questioning of Meletus, one of his
accusers.
II. THE PROBLEM OF FALSE YET PERSUASIVE SPEECH

Socrates begins, "How you, men of Athens, have been affected by
my accusers, I do not know. For my part, even I nearly forgot myself
because of them, so persuasively did they speak. And yet they have
said, so to speak, nothing true" (17a).
The accusers' speech is false but persuasive. If their arguments,
though false, can still persuade, might Socrates' arguments, even if
true, nevertheless fail to persuade? He implies that an audience can be
moved by a false argument, or can fail to be moved by a true one.
True arguments are not necessarily effective, and effective arguments
not necessarily true.
This means that simply to tell the truth may not lead to justice being
done. Like 'the facts," the truth does not "speak for itself." If we
want the truth that is told in court to lead to just judgment, we have to
add something to it. Why is the truth alone insufficient, truth "naked"
or "unvarnished"? And what has to be added to make it effectual in
practice?
If an argument in court can be false yet at the same time persuasive,
we have to wonder about the prospects for a defendant, such as
Socrates, whether or not guilty, to get justice in Athens. Does he,
perhaps, suppose the same problem is to be found in any city? If this
is what Socrates means to imply, then should we not be shocked at his
suggestion that judges and juries can be moved to decide as they do by

arguments that are partly or even mostly false?
On the other hand, does not every experienced trial judge and trial
lawyer know that things like this do happen sometimes? This is one of
the reasons, is it not, that our procedural law provides for appeals,
new trials, and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Judges and juries make mistakes, and it is sometimes a persuasive but
false argument that has led them to do so.
Socrates, on trial for his life many centuries ago, begins his defense
by calling attention to a problem that proves on examination to be quite
familiar-the relation between truth and justice. We know from our
own experience that simply telling the truth does not mean you will
always be judged fairly. We have observed, too, that lying-e.g.,
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perjury or "poker-bluffing" in negotiation-does not always accomplish its object. Both truth and lies can be presented either artfully or
inartfully.
The art of persuasive speech is the art of argument, and persuasive
speech in court is the special art of the trial lawyer. Argument, speech
intended to move people to action, seems to those of us who work in
the law, to be an instrument, a tool that can be used for help or harm.
If a smooth lie can succeed and a clumsy truth fail, then truth needs the
help of the art of argument. The good lawyer's weapon against an
artful lie is an even more artful truth. Argument, then, is the art of
speech that in practical affairs mediates between truth and justice.
Socrates says his accusers spoke "many falsehoods" in "beautifully
spoken speeches," "adorned with phrases and words" (17a, b). They
spoke artful lies. An effective defense would seem to require that
Socrates speak the truth even more artfully than his accusers spoke
their persuasive falsehoods. Yet he announces right away that this is
just what he will not do.
I am not "a clever speaker," he tells the jury, and you will see this as
soon as I have talked for a few minutes-unless my accusers "call a
clever speaker the one who speaks the truth." If I am an "orator," I am
not "one of their sort." (17b).
Socrates promises to tell the truth without art or guile: "at random in
the words I happen upon," "in the dialect and way in which I was
raised," the same common, ordinary, everyday speech he has been
accustomed to use "in the marketplace ... and elsewhere" (17 b-d).
Just plain old Socrates. In short, he will not talk like a lawyer.
We now find ourselves puzzled. We know from our own experience, and we have noticed that Socrates knew too, that the simply
unadorned truth does not invariably prevail in court; it needs that help
which it is the trial lawyer's special aim, with his art of forensic
rhetoric, to give. But Socrates, appearing as his own lawyer, says he
will not use the lawyer's art.
Is he slickering? Is it part of his art that he persuade the jury to
believe he is not using any art? Is it indeed intrinsic to the art of
rhetoric that the advocate try to make the audience forget that the
speaker is artful? We are reminded of the campaign speeches of
certain candidates for national (and other) political offices.
Or is Socrates' defense going to be a deliberate failure? His defense
is a failure in the ordinary sense: he is convicted. If he indeed told the
truth, as he promised to do, the fact of conviction implies that he was
guilty, or not wholly innocent, assuming that the truth he told brought
about the conviction. But if he was guilty, why would he deliberately
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present an ineffective defense? Is the answer that a man who is guilty
and also truthful has no other choice, because he knows he deserves to
be convicted?
Must the honest but guilty defendant not use the art of argument
because to do so might succeed in getting him acquitted? Acquittal
would be an injustice-an injustice to himself, because of his honesty
(it is unjust to yourself to be less than your best), an injustice to the
city because of his guilt. Must we conclude that for Socrates, telling
the plain unadorned truth is the only way to do justice both to himself
and to the city?
This possibility implies that Socrates is guilty. We now notice that
he does not say his accusers are liars, or that their accusation is
unqualifiedly false: "they have said, so to speak, nothing true" (17a34) (emphasis added). Another translation of the weasel words could
be, "in a manner of speaking." What the accusers said is in some
way, or in some part, not false. Socrates quietly or back-handedly
concedes that something in the charges is true.
Is the accusers' speech persuasive because it is somehow akin to the
truth? Or is it persuasive in spite of being mostly false? Was Socrates
convicted because his defense argument, even though true, was weak?
Or because the prosecution's argument, though not in all respects true,
was nevertheless persuasive? Or because Socrates deliberately decided
not to try to refute convincingly whatever was both true and persuasive
in the accusers' speech?
Suppose, on the other hand, that Socrates is not guilty. Then he has
an obvious practical difficulty, one that every trial lawyer faces in
preparing for trial, every trial judge faces in preparing jury instructions, every appellate judge faces in writing an opinion for publication.
Can a truthful speech or argument (or explanation) persuade an
audience that is not capable of understanding the truth?
Everyone knows that parents must sometimes require children of a
certain age to do things the reasons for which the children cannot fully
grasp. Do we not also recognize that there are adults who sometimes
act like children, in the willfulness of their desires or the irrationality of
their appetites and passions? We all know, or have heard about,
people who regularly do harmful things to themselves in respect of the
pleasures of food and sex, for example. We know, too, do we not,
that just as we are not all alike in dealing with bodily pleasures, neither
are we alike in mental faculties.
To be effective, an argument must persuade the audience to whom it
is addressed, but not all audiences are equally capable of understanding the subject at hand. Neither are all members of a given audience
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equally able to understand a particular argument. The group of
students in one classroom, the jury in a particular courtroom, the
several members of a panel of judges hearing the oral arguments on an
appeal--each of these audiences has its capacities and limitations.
Different arguments will be made, for example, about, say, homosexuals in the military services, to members of Congress, on one hand,
and to the courts, on the other, and even to different judges on the
same court.
But if the truth is persuasive only when -the audience can understand
it, and if some audiences cannot fully understand the truth or can
understand it only if it is presented in a certain way, then the speaker
who knows the truth will find it necessary, by means of something
other than the truth, to guide his audience to take whatever action the
truth (and therefore justice?) requires.
In the same way, the painter who wants the viewer to see a road
going off into the distance will draw the boundaries of the road wide
apart in the lower or "front" part of the picture and closer together in
the higher or "back" part, so that when we look at it, we will see the
same thing we would see if we looked at a real road that went off into
the distance. But we know all along that Interstate 80 is the same
width in Des Moines as in Chicago.
The advocate must be an artist with speech, just as the painter must
be an artist with color and perspective. Is argument, then, inherently
deceptive? Must the good trial lawyer know how to distort, how, in
effect, to lie?
Must the good judge, in writing an opinion announcing, explaining,
and justifying what the court has decided, sometimes omit or distort
some of the real reasons for the decision? What worker in the law has
not had the experience of finding a rather different statement of facts in
a dissenting opinion than appears in the majority opinion?
We are led into deep waters by this hypothesis that because individuals and groups differ in their capacity to grasp the truth, it is therefore
sometimes necessary to distort the truth for the sake of justice. Let us
consider where it leads.
Most college graduates have heard of Einstein's formula, E=mc 2. It
says that the energy of a body in motion is equal to its mass multiplied
by the square of the speed of light. How many of us who are not
physicists can make a just claim to genuine understanding of what this
formula really means?
In everyday life, we use telephones, automobiles, copying
machines, and other devices whose principles of operation most of us
have only the scantiest knowledge of. Most of us, rely, too on our
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doctor's knowledge of medical science, which is largely mysterious to
us, to help preserve our health. Modem technology has surrounded us
with machines, processes, and operations we are very likely never
going to understand fully (nor, as to most of them, do we really need
to).
In Socrates' trial, both the accusers and the defendant speak to a
jury of several hundred adult male citizens. The charges are corrupting
the young and impiety. Is there a truth about these things, a truth
about what is the best education for the young and about what one
should believe about the gods? If there is, is it a truth accessible to
everyone, like the wetness of water and the heat of the sun? Or is it a
truth like Einstein's formula, fully intelligible only to a few people of
great natural intelligence and after long study?
Our own contemporary opinions about the proper education for the
young often seem to be divided between those who believe parents
know best and those who believe professional "educators" know best.
Who is likely to know more about the best education for the young in
Athens, the democratically selected jurymen or Socrates? Are either
Socrates or his accusers capable of knowing the truth about how to
bring up the young, about what we should believe about the gods? Is
the jury capable of understanding the truth about these things?
In the literature of the law, especially in the writings of decent and
conscientious judges, we often read that a trial is a "search for the
truth." In what sense is this correct? What truth is a jury in our legal
system supposed to search for? What truth do we assume-if we do
indeed assume it-Socrates' jury was supposed to search for? By
what means do we search for whatever truth there is about education
and the gods?
III.

THE "FIRST FALSE CHARGES"

Socrates says the "first false charges" were made by accusers who
are anonymous: "it is not even possible to know and to say their
names" (18a,d). Then he qualifies this assertion: "unless a certain one
happens to be a comic poet." (18d). Virtually everyone listening
would have understood he meant Aristophanes, whom he identifies by
name a couple minutes later (19c). By singling out Aristophanes in
this way, Socrates makes him stand for the so-called "first" or "long
ago" accusers (18a, e).
The old accusations about Socrates have their origin in the things
said about him by a comic poet. Poetry, in the form of Aristophanes'
Clouds, by poking fun at Socrates, has shaped the popular opinion
about who and what Socrates is, about what philosophy and philoso-
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phizing involve, and about why the activity of philosophers, men
capable of genuine and independent thought, is dangerous to the city.
Socrates says the first accusers are "more dangerous" to him than
the present accusers (18b). But there seems to be a relation between
the two groups. All three of the present accusers are named by
Socrates at one point (and only one point); they are Meletus, Anytus,
and Lycon (23e, 24a). Each is said to represent a different political
constituency. Men in each of these interest groups are the persons
Socrates says he questioned in order to find out, "in accordance with
the god" (22a), whether they were wise in the matters they claimed to
be. This questioning, because it exposed the ignorance and pretense
of those questioned, made them angry. And their anger is what motivated this "political" prosecution of Socrates (28a-b).
Meletus "attacked" Socrates on behalf of the poets, Anytus on
behalf of the craftsmen and politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the
orators (23e-24a) (it is the orators who practice the lawyer's art,
rhetoric). Since it is Meletus whom Socrates chooses to cross-examine, we may infer Socrates regarded him as in some sense the principal
accuser (see also Plato's Euthyphro (2b-d)). And since Meletus is
identified as a representative of the poets, in fact was himself a poet,
though certainly of minor accomplishment, we see that the opinions,
or opposition, of the poets seem to be a prime element in the present
charges against Socrates as well as in the "first" or "long ago" charges.
Socrates calls attention to this connection by observing that in
bringing the indictment, Meletus "trusted in" the "slander" (19b) that
had originally arisen, according to Socrates, at least in part from
Aristophanes' play. The older poet and "accuser," a man of considerable intelligence, is relied on by the present accuser, a younger poet
who is greatly the inferior in both gifts and accomplishments.
Yet under the surface of both the old, popular charges and the
present, legal charges is a unifying theme: Socrates seems to believe
that his real enemies are poets and poetry. Beneath the legal argument
between Athens and Socrates lies a deeper contest, represented by its
then leading spokesmen, Socrates and Aristophanes. This deeper
argument is between philosophy and poetry.
Because of our popular notions about what "poetry" means and
what a poem is, -we modem readers have to stretch our imaginations in
order to get an inkling of what it means to speak of an argument, or
quarrel, between poetry and philosophy.
The root of "poem," "poet," and "poetry," is a Greek verb that
means "to make." Poetry is something made, not something that
occurs in nature. And at least since Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) wrote his
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treatise, Poetics, poetry has meant a literary product of the human
imagination. The idea of poetry as verse that rhymes, or unrhymed
expressions of feeling or sentiment, is a stunted and constricted sense
of the word's full original meaning.
For Socrates' audience at his trial, poetry meant, at least, the long
narrative epic poems of Homer (the Iliad and the Odyssey) and of
Hesiod (Theogony, Works and Days), the Greek tragedies of
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the comedies of
Aristophanes. Most scholars believe that Homer lived before Hesiod,
but both are generally dated around 700 B.C. The three playwrights
were all alive in the sixth century B.C. The eldest, Aeschylus, died
thirteen years before Socrates was born; the other two, Sophocles and
Euripides, both died in 406, seven years before Socrates' trial.
Perhaps most important for our purposes, the poems of Homer and
Hesiod, and the plays by the three great tragedians, were the texts by
which the Greeks transmitted their beliefs about the gods, the ordering
of divine and human affairs, and their moral teachings about how men
should live. This literature served them as drama, theology, and moral
philosophy combined. It provided, in fact, an important part of the
education for Athenian youth. Homer was the chief author studied in
Athens for moral training at the elementary school level, for example.
Why does Socrates regard as his most dangerous enemies the
authors of those works which later generations have come to regard as
among the greatest literature ever produced in the West?
According to Socrates, he is the target of a long-standing popular
prejudice, which Aristophanes had relied on when he wrote Clouds
almost twenty-five years previously. The playwright could expect the
audience to laugh at his play's burlesque of Socrates because he knew
that most of them would recognize who, and what, was being parodied. Socrates' first line of defense is therefore to try to uproot or at
least undermine this long-standing popular prejudice.
He refers to its originators as his "first accusers" (18a). These
accusers are many, and they began slandering Socrates a long time
ago, when many of the jurors were young and trusting, but nothing of
what they have been saying for so many years is true (18b). Yet they
are more dangerous than the present accusers, because the things they
said about Socrates prompted their listeners to believe that he did not
believe in gods (18c). We thus learn that church and state are not
separate in Athens. Religion is a public, or political, concern. It
makes a difference what religion you have, or profess-what you do
and what you say about the gods. It is dangerous to be suspected of
being a non-believer.
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Evidently, though, these first accusers did not directly charge
Socrates with atheism; rather, they accused him of things that caused
their listeners to suppose he was an atheist. These "first false charges"
are that Socrates is "a thinker on the things aloft, who has investigated
all things under the earth, and who makes the weaker speech the
stronger." (18b-c).
The most obvious meaning of "things aloft" is the sun, moon, and
stars. Socrates was accused of being a student of astronomy. Is this,
perhaps, the origin of the title of Aristophanes' play? A serious, that
is, scientific, interest in the heavenly bodies and their motions, i.e., in
astronomy and physics, can be parodied by representing it as an interest in clouds, something "aloft" that is airy and insubstantial, hence
trivial and of no real account.
The first words Aristophanes' has Socrates speak in Clouds are
instructive: "I tread on air and contemplate the sun" (line 225). In the
play, Socrates is suspended aloft in a basket when he says this. In his
defense speech, at trial, Socrates himself refers specifically to this line
in the play (19c). We can understand Socrates' argument in the
Apology better if we try to get some sense of the meaning this line in
Clouds would have had for its original audience.
The general attitude toward the sun, moon, stars, and other heavenly bodies was that they were gods. In his cross-examination of
Meletus, Socrates makes specific mention of this popular belief (26d).
According to Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent
Philosophers (II.12), the philosopher Anaxagoras, who died when
Socrates was in his early forties, was indicted for impiety on the
ground of having said the sun was a mass of red-hot metal, that is, for
saying indirectly in the name of Science that the sun was not divine.
Scholars fix the probable date of Anaxagoras' trial as 450 B.C., just
half a century before the trial of Socrates. With the help of political
friends, Anaxagoras escaped from Athens and settled in another city.
But Socrates, though certainly thus aware that leaving town was a
politically available option, will refuse to consider this way of
responding to the charges against him, charges similar in part to those
against Anaxagoras (37c; see also Plato's Crito (44b-c)).
Twenty-five years after the trial of Anaxagoras, some in the audience for Clouds (423 B.C.), especially among those of middle age,
would almost certainly have been reminded of him when the character
Socrates says, "I tread on air and contemplate the sun."
Contemplating the sun was what got Anaxagoras in trouble.
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To make sure the jurors at his trial, fifty years after that of
Anaxagoras, make the comparison, Socrates mentions Anaxagoras by
name (26d).
When Aristophanes parodied Socrates by presenting him as a
philosopher given to the scientific study of nature, he was appealing to
the popular prejudice that science and religion could not mix, that
philosophers, or scientists, in their too-much curiosity about nature
and its workings, lacked sufficient respect for the forces and mysteries
beyond their ken; were, in short, atheists.
We might recognize here an ancient parallel to the trial of John T.
Scopes in 1925 for violating a Tennessee statute that prohibited teaching Darwin's theory of evolution. (Scopes was convicted and fined
$100, but the state supreme court reversed the conviction on the
ground that the fine was excessive). The more recent debate over
"creationism" is another instance of the public perception, evidently
very deeply rooted, that religion and science must be in conflict.
We can now see why Socrates and the poets were on different sides
of the fence. To contemplate the sun, as Aristophanes presents
Socrates doing, means to study it intently with a view to finding out its
nature. The religious beliefs of the times called, however, for an
attitude not of curiosity but of reverence toward heavenly bodies. The
deep issue in the trial is between those who transmit traditional
religion, and thus shape conventional morality and public opinion (the
poets), and those who in the name of science question the poetic
accounts of the things aloft (philosophers, such as Socrates).
IV. THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MELETUS
When he has finished his argument against the old, popular
"charges" (18a-24b), Socrates turns to the formal legal charges that he
"does injustice by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the
gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are novel"
(24b-c). He undertakes to examine "each one of the parts of this
charge," and, accordingly, some of the questions in his cross-examination of Meletus are directed to each of the charge's two specifications (18b-c).
"Daimonia"is the translator's spelling in English letters of the plural
form of the Greek word that is the root of our word "demon" (from
French demon, derived from Latin daemon, derived from Greek
daimon). For us, "demon" means primarily an evil spirit, but the
original meaning of daimon (plural, daimonia) carried no necessary
connotation of malevolence; it meant only a secondary divinity, a being
who was ranked between gods and men.
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The cross-examination is in three parts. The first two relate to
corrupting the young, the third and last to the impiety count. The two
counts prove to be related: it is by teaching the young not to believe in
the gods the city believes in that Socrates corrupts the young, according to Meletus (26b).
We can get some sense of Socrates as a cross-examiner from
looking carefully at the series of about ten questions in the first part of
the examination. The first question is to this effect: Meletus, you
think it is most important for the young to be as good as possible,
don't you (24d)?
Tactically, this is a good beginning. The question is so framed as to
admit only of a yes answer (which helps the examiner establish
control), is not openly threatening, and does not reveal the examiner's
strategy or objective. Meletus gives the desired answer, "I do," apparently without hesitation. Nothing in the text suggests that he is
troubled by the question or reluctant to answer it.
This incautiousness is our first hint of his lack of good judgment.
Socrates was well-known in Athens as a wily questioner. Thus, a
more savvy or astute witness, knowing Socrates' reputation and so put
on guard by the very innocence of the opening question, would likely
have given a more cagey answer than Meletus does. But his response
is prompt and unsuspecting.
Who makes the young better? is the second question. Meletus does
not answer immediately, but is silent. Does he sense trouble? He has
said he thinks it most important for the youth to be good. If he
answers, "I don't know," he might appear foolish. He would reveal
himself as a man who believes a certain end to be of great importance,
that the youth be good, but who has not, with respect to how that end
is to be achieved, thought long enough or deeply enough to form any
opinion about the best means to the end. Socrates needles him on just
this point, commenting, "it is clear that you know [who makes the
youth better], since you care [about their being made better]" (24d).
Meletus could answer by naming or describing the persons or
groups whom he thinks make the youth better. But he would risk
offending those members of the jury and audience who are not among
the men designated. No member of the jury or audience would wish
to suppose, or to admit, or to be reminded, that his own influence on
the young is indifferent, or not good, or even bad. Meletus senses the
trap and is silent.
We, the readers, begin to see Socrates' strategy. He prefaced his
first question by saying that Meletus "jests in a serious matter ...
pretending to be serious and concerned about things for which he
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never cared at all" (24c). We now find out that the "serious matter"
Socrates has in mind is the education, in particular the moral
education, of the young. Meletus accuses Socrates of corrupting the
young, and Socrates defends himself by trying to show that Meletus is
not truly concerned about the young and how they can best be
educated.
If Meletus does not know and has not even thought very much
about how the young are made better, then his accusation that Socrates
makes them bad will lose credit, for how could Meletus know that
Socrates corrupts the young when he is himself unable to say who
makes them better, or how this is done?
Socrates goads Meletus, saying his silence is "proof" that he has
never cared for the young at all. He pushes his advantage by repeating
the question, "But tell, my good man, who makes them better?" (24d).
Meletus answers, "The laws," in, we can imagine, a guarded, if not
hostile, tone, indicating that he is wary of danger.
Socrates, sensing he has the upper hand, presses his attack with a
third question: what human being is it who knows the laws? To which
Meletus answers promptly, "These men, Socrates, the judges." (24e).
The question supposes what is self-evident: the laws do not make
or enforce themselves. Human agency is called for. Socrates appears
to accept Meletus' assertion that the city's laws do make the young
better, but he is not deterred from his object. The question, "who
knows the laws?," shows us that his object is to lead Meletus into
making claims so improbable as to suggest by implication the
implausibility of his accusations against Socrates.
After Meletus has said that it is the jurymen who know the laws,
Socrates has to connect up two threads of his examination. Meletus
asserts that the laws make the young better, and he asserts as well that
the jurymen know the laws. To make his argument clear to the jury,
Socrates, in his next question, now connects these two assertions with
his theme, which is the corruption and improvement of the young.
"Are these men here able to educate the young, and do they make them
better?" (24e).
Meletus is cornered, though he seems not to know it. He can give
only the affirmative answer Socrates wants. If the laws make the
young better and the jurymen know the laws, it would seem to follow
necessarily that the jurymen make the young better. The confident
"Very much so" with which Meletus answers suggests, again, his
obtuseness, for he is unable to see what we readers can see plainly,
that Socrates is about to close the trap.
Socrates does this with several short, pointed questions. Do all the
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jurymen make the young better, or only some? All of them. Do the
members of the audience make the young better, too? Yes. The
Councilmen? Yes. Assemblymen? Yes. You're really saying that
everybody in Athens makes the young better except me, isn't that
right? "I do say this, most vehemently." (24e-25a)
This last answer gives yet another clue to the character of Meletus.
Imprudent and obtuse, he is also subject to his passions, especially the
passion of anger. This impression is confirmed at various points in
the rest of the examination. He is so obviously the inferior of Socrates
that it is not unusual for some readers to feel that the examiner is bullying the witness.
Socrates' method in this first part of the examination is a reductio ad
absurdum. Meletus claims that everyone in Athens improves the
young and makes them better except Socrates, but this claim seems
confounded by ordinary experience. In everyday life, it is not the
many who teach and improve the few, but the reverse. The few who
are trained in each specific art or skill are those who can educate and
improve others in it.
Socrates' argument to this effect (25b-c) concludes the first part of
the cross-examination. This argument, admirable in its brevity, begins
with four rhetorical questions. You say I alone corrupt the young; is
this true also of horses? Does everyone make them better, while just
one man corrupts them? Or is it that one man or a few men skilled in
horsemanship improve them, while the many, who are not skilled,
corrupt them? This is the case with horses and other animals, too,
isn't it?
Meletus is silent, an acknowledgment of defeat. Having scored his
first point, Socrates, like a good advocate, sums up before turning to
the middle part of the cross-examination: What I say is true, whether
you and Anytus deny it or affirm it. If only one man corrupted the
young while everybody else improved them, the young would be
indeed fortunate. That this is so improbable shows that you, Meletus,
"never yet gave any thought to the young." (25c).
It would be odd, would it not, if in a fair-sized city, such as Athens
was in 399, one man alone had the power to corrupt the young in
some serious way. Might it not also be odd, though, that the power to
improve the young should be in some men and the power to harm
them in other men? Is not the power to do genuine good also the
power to do real harm?
In the stories of both Agatha Christie and Arthur Conan Doyle, for
example, the most clever killers are the hardest to catch. Real wickedness requires some intelligence; this is the reason con men, embez-
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zlers, and forgers enjoy more prestige than muggers and rapists in the
social hierarchy inside prisons (though killers may command more
outward respect). The choice between good and evil as an object is
made by the will, but the power to achieve the chosen end is in the
intelligence.
Thus the more thoughtful jurors must have wondered whether
Meletus is such a fool as Socrates makes him appear. Everyone
present at the trial knew of Socrates' remarkable intelligence. They
knew, too, some from direct observation, others from reports by
witnesses, of Socrates' remarkable skill in asking unsettling questions.
To those who knew these things, and who remembered them during
this part of the cross-examination, it might not have seemed strange for
Meletus to claim that a man with Socrates' unique gifts of intellect
could be the most dangerous corrupter of the young in the entire city,
particularly when his intelligence and rhetorical skill are put in the
service of a deep curiosity about nature and a consequent skepticism
about the basis of those conventional opinions upon which decent civic
life always depends.
V. EPILOGUE: THE UNEXAMINED LIFE

Near the end of the second of his three speeches, after the jury has
voted to convict, Socrates says:
And on the other hand, if I say that this even happens to be a
very great good for a human being-to make speeches every
day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me
conversing and examining both myself and others-and that the
unexamined life is not worth living for a human being, you will
be persuaded by me still less when I say these things (38a).
Socrates urges us to examine ourselves, to weigh our lives in the
balance, to think everyday about virtue. We recall that according to
Xenophon's report (p. 507, above), Socrates thought that the "finest
preparation" for his defense was never during his life to have done
wrong to any man.
Socrates lived his whole life as if he would be called upon at the end
to give an account of it. Is not Jesus' teaching essentially the same?
"Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust
doth corrupt, and thieves break through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt,
and thieves do not break through and steal" (Matt. 6:19-20). "Not
everyone that saith to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter the Kingdom of
heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven"
(Matt. 7:21).
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To be sure, Jesus seems to be more confident than Socrates of who
it is that will render judgment on our lives when the time for judgment
has come. It is God the Father, Maker of all things, Judge of all men.
Socrates, by contrast, in his third and last speech, does not claim to
know what death is like, nor whether the soul is immortal, nor
whether, if it is, life in this world is better or worse than life in the
hereafter. "But now it is time to go away, I to die and you to live.
Which of us goes to a better thing is unclear to everyone except to the
god." (42a).
These are questions that thoughtful men and women always wonder
about. What is very striking about Socrates' consideration of them is
that he does not suppose his uncertainty about the answers is an
excuse or justification for failing or refusing to ask the questions. The
unexamined life, he says, is not worth living (38a). But he does not
promise that the examination will lead to clear and definitive answers
or, indeed, to any "answers" at all, if by answers we mean rules,
principles, and ideas which once they become settled convictions in
our minds, can be safely tucked away and held protected from further
scrutiny.
Quite the contrary. Even when he is on trial for his life, at the age
of seventy, Socrates persists in examining his own life and the lives of
his fellow citizens, including those who make up the jury that is
charged with deciding whether he shall live or die. His actions seem
to say that the work of examining one's life, of asking ourselves how
we should live and why, is itself a noble task even if there are no
demonstrably certain answers. If indeed this was Socrates' work,
then Plato's work must have been to show his readers how this examination should be conducted. For men and women who are trained in
the law, then, and who are occupied daily with its business, the work
of Plato's Apology of Socrates is to show them how to conduct a
serious inquiry into the meaning of what they are doing.
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APPENDIX

There are numerous translations available of Plato's dialogues,
including the Apology. But for the serious reader, the best by far is
that of Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West in a Cornell University
Press paper-back (1984) titled Four Texts on Socrates. This translation is the most accurate, the volume is accessible and cheap, and it
includes, in addition to the Apology, also Plato's Euthyphro and Crito
and Aristophanes' Clouds.
Euthyphro is a conversation Socrates has outside the court house
enroute to his trial. The other party to the conversation, Euthyphro, is
a young man on his way to indict his father for murder. Crito takes
place after Socrates' trial; it is a conversation between him and an old
friend, Crito, with whom the philosopher grew up. Crito wants to
help Socrates escape; in the dialogue, Socrates explains to Crito why
he will not accept this offer.
Another useful dialogue for beginning students of the Apology is
Phaedo, an account of Socrates' death. The edition published by
Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, is good (Grube tr., 1977).
The best translation of Symposium is Seth Benardete's; of the
Republic, Allan Bloom's; of the Laws, Thomas Pangle's. All three
are available in good, inexpensive paperback editions.
For the works of Xenophon and Diogenes Laertius, the editions in
the Loeb Classical Library, published by Harvard University Press,
are readily available and inexpensive.
The leading original source on the Peloponnesian War is
Thucydides' History of the PeloponnesianWar. The best translation
is that of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). A reliable edition of this
translation, edited by David Grene, with a useful introduction by him,
has recently been published by the University of Chicago Press.
Biographical and other useful information about the persons and
events mentioned in this essay can be found in the Oxford Classical
Dictionary, which should be available in the reference room of any
good college or university library.

